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by DARRYL R. FRANCIS
credit as the reliable leading indicator. Those analysts
that focus on bank credit have been greatly concerned
about the possibility of excessive expansion and a
marked step up in inflationary pressures Smce last
July, commercial bank credit outstanding has risen
at a rapid 16 percent annual rate. By comparison, dur-
ing the period from mid-1970 to mid-1972, when
aggressive actions — both fiscal and monetary — were
taken to stimulate the economy which was recovering
from the latest recession, bank credit rose at a 12 per-
cent rate. The average rate of bank credit growth
from 1957 to 1970 was about 7 percent.
IS GOOD to be here and to have this opportunity
to discuss a topic of paramount importance to those in
the business of banking as well as to the public at
large.1 Most economic analysts now believe that
monetary developments have a pervasive and sig-
nificant effect on all types of economic activity. For
this reason, I appreciate your invitation to express my
views, which I must hasten to admit are not univer-
sally held, but on which I have developed a strong
feeling over several years of association with what I
believe to be the highest quality of empirical research.
This is an especially interesting time to be discuss-
ing monetary developments in view of the consider-
able differences of opinion on how to measure and
interpret the developments in the first half of 1973.
Some analysts interpret recent monetary actions to
have been quite expansionary, indicating an ebullient
economy with an intensification of inflationary forces.
On the other hand, others have indicated concern
over what they deem undue monetary restraint with
a likelihood of a recession late this year or early in
1974. I hope I will not add to the confusion by out-
lining for you my own interpretation of economic
developments so far this year and what they may
imply for the future. Before doing so, I think it would
be useful to review some of the interpretations of re-
cent monetary actions that have received widespread
attention and the facts upon which these interpreta-
tions have been based.
Bank Credit
One prominent view of recent monetary develop-
ments has centered on the growth of commercial bank Actually, bank loans have risen more rapidly m re-
cent months than total bank credit. Total commercial
bank loans outstanding have risen at almost a 23 per-
cent annual rate since last July. Investment holdings
of banks rose only moderately most of last fall, and
iThis address was delivered at the Seventy-Sixth Annual Con-
vention
0
f the Indiana Bankers Association, French Lick, In-
diana, June 13, 1973. Dnta that have become available since
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have declined since January as banks have sought
funds to finance the requirements of thcir business
and consumer customers. It has been reasoned that
the accelerated expansion of total bank credit this
year would supplement the funds available for spend-
ing by the public, and therefore should be interpreted
as a strong inflationary force in the economy.
The head of Chase Econometric Associates, Inc.,
the forecasting, analysis, and consulting subsidiary of
the Chase Manhattan Corporation, indicated in a
newsletter that bank credit developments have been
an important element in “the unprecedented increase”
in spending.2 Increases in bank credit have been
much greater than in prior periods of rapid economic
expansion. Although the money stock, defined to in-
clude currency in the hands of the public and private
demand deposits, did slow during the first quarter of
1973, Chase Econometrics noted that banks were able
to expand their credit because of an unusual buildup
in Treasury deposits in commercial banks (which are
not included in the definition of the money stock).
Also, banks sold an increasingly larger amount of
large negotiable certificates of deposit to raise funds
to expand loans. Hence, the huge credit expansion
was accomplished at a time of relatively slow growth
of the money stock. Chase Econometrics concluded
that concentrating on the narrow definition of money,
while neglecting what occurred in credit markets, is
an acute case of “M1 myopia.” I would agree that the
tightness or ease indicated by a given growth of M1
should not be analyzed in a vacuum, but Id onot go
all the way with the second part of the conclusion —
namely, that the acceleration of bank credit growth
indicates more stimulative monetary actions this year
than last.
Interest Rates
Another approach to assessing monetary develop-
ments has been to focus on the cost of credit rather
than on volume. Interest rates, particularly short-term
rates, have risen substantially since last fall. The rate
on bank loans to prime business customers has risen
from 51/4 percent last August to 8¼ percent recently.
Yields on Treasury bills, commercial paper, bankers
acceptances and other money market instruments
have risen even more sharply
When credit costs rise and funds become less
readily available, it is reasoned that businessmen and
2
See “The Macroeconomic Forecasts,” of Chase Econometrics,
Inc., April 25, 1973.
consumers are forced to trim their expenditures. Ac-
cording to this view, the exceptional rate of increase
in total spending in the past few quarters would have
been even greater if interest rates had not risen. More
importantly, higher costs of credit affect future spend-
ing plans, and hence, some are becoming concerned
that interest rate behavior, possibly even a credit
crunch, could foster an economic downturn in the
near future. An example of this approach was pre-
sented in a recent issue of a national news magazine,
where in discussing the task of restraining inflation it
was stated, “If this tight money policy is continued for
long, ...it could well lead to oppressive interest
rates, a drying up of credit and a dangerous slowdown
in the economy comparable to the 1970 recession.”3
Money Stock
A third view frequently cited in the press and ad-
visory services has been put forth by some mone-
tarists who have been concerned that monetary ac-
tions may have become too restrictive. The money
stock of the nation rose at only a 2 percent annual
rate from December to March this year. By compari-
son, money rose at a 7 percent rate on average in the
previous two years. It was argued that this sharp slow-
ing in the growth of the narrowly defined money stock,
if continued, would lead to a substantial economic
slowdown. When people have less money than they
~Beprinted by permission from TIME, The Weekly News-
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desire to hold, given current economic conditions,
they tend to reduce their rate of spending.
The April 1973 “Monthly Economic Letter” of the
First National City Bank states, “In an atmosphere
in which more and more people are asking whether
credit conditions in 1973 could approach those during
the ‘crunch’ periods of 1966 and 1969, it is increas-
ingly evident that the commercial banking system is
in the midst of a tight squeeze.”4 Loan demand has
been unusually great. Yet, “since late 1972, the mone-
tary authorities have refused to supply any more re-
serves to the banking system. Through December,
total reserves — and consequently the money supply —
continued to rise rapidly because banks sharply in-
creased the reserves they were willing to borrow from
the Fed. But since early January, banks have been so
heavily in debt to the Fed that they have been un-
willing to increase their borrowings much more, de-
spite the continued climb in credit demands and in
interest rates on bank loans, Consequently, .. re-
serves available against private nonbank deposits, and
the money supply .. have zigzagged sideways.”
According to the First National City Bank “Letter”,
commercial banks have increased their credit largely
by aggressive bidding for CD funds, which results in
more total deposits with a given amount of reserves.
However, Citibank argues that “the sharp slowdown
in money stock growth has led to speculation about
the possibility of monetary overkill.”
Our View
Turning to our interpretation at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis of the developments in early
1973, I cannot agree with those who hold the view
that the recent rapid growth of bank credit can be
taken as an indication that monetary actions have
been more stimulative this year than last. Nor can I
agree with either the interest rate approach or a strict
narrow money approach which argues that monetary
developments so far this year have been unduly re-
strictive. Noxv, let me see if I can outline for you the
problems with each of the three foregoing positions.
It is true that bank credit has been rising at a
phenomenal rate in recent months. If this credit were
entirely newly-created credit in the sense of being
an addition to total credit, then I would be in more
agreement with those who are concerned about an
acceleration in the growth of bank credit. However,
the facts are that a major share of this credit merely




to borrowers through the banking system rather than
through other channels.
You may recall that earlier this year the Committee
on Interest and Dividends successfully encouraged
commercial banks to refrain froni increasing interest
rates on loans — particularly the prime rate — even
though market conditions indicated that such a move
was appropriate. As a result many borrowers found
that rates offered by commercial banks were more
attractive than rates on funds from other sources —
such as commercial paper. Hence, demand for credit
by businesses tended to shift toward banks. In order
to meet the loan demand, banks obtained funds, that
previously had flowed into commercial paper and
other market instruments, by aggressively pricing
their large certificates of deposit. Thus, the rapid rise
in commercial bank credit was largely offset by a
smaller volume of other credit, At the same time, total
credit in the economy was not very much affected by
the somewhat artificial and temporary upward move-
ment in bank credit.
Fears of an economic downturn based on the re-
cent marked rise in interest rates is similarly only a
partial analysis. If the jump in interest rates were
solely the result of a monetary contraction, then I
\vould agree that a slowing or a decline in economic
activity would likely result. So, let us review the facts
behind the interest rate rise.
Interest rates are a price for the use of borrowed
funds. Rates are determined by supplies of and de-
mands for funds — just as the prices of housing, food,
or other goods are set by demand and supply. There
is no factual indication that the supplies of loanable
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funds have been contracting this year. Personal and
corporate incomes have risen at rapid rates; the pro-
vision of central bank credit, as indicated by the
rapid growth of Federal Reserve credit and the mone-
tary base, has not been cut-off; and the growth of
commercial bank credit has accelerated from last year.
The strongest upward force on market interest
rates late last year and in early 1973— probably ac-
counting for the bulk of the rise — came from the
demand side. Economic activity — stimulated by the
rapid monetary expansion of 1971 and 1972 — has
been increasing rapidly. Accompanying the greater
activity has been a strengthening in the demand for
credit by businesses and consumers. Also, inflationary
pressures have intensified as the economy has ap-
proached a high level of capacity utilization. In the
past it has been observed that when expectations of
higher inflation rise, interest rates rise even more.
Lenders seek to protect the purchasing power of their
funds, while borrowers accept the higher rates in an-
ticipation of repaying in cheaper dollars.
Hence, the higher interest rates are primarily a
result of the greater credit demands associated with
the rapid expansion of business activity and the rising
expectations about future inflation. In short, present
interest rate levels are primarily the lagged result of
rapid monetary expansion during 1971 and 1972. Cur-
rent monetary actions have probably played only a
minor role in recent interest rate developments.
Hence, any overall restraining effect on the economy
from the marked rise in market interest rates to date
is likely to be slight. Individual borrowers, it is true,
have been finding funds increasingly more difficult
and more costly to obtain as the demand for credit
has been rising even more rapidly than the increasing
supplies. But this does not imply that aggregate eco-
nomic activity is being stifled by inadequate credit.
Most of the time I find myself among those who
follow closely the trends of money stock growth in
analyzing the impact of monetary actions on the econ-
omy. However, I feel the conclusion that monetary
actions were unduly restrictive in the first few months
of this year because of the slow money growth in that
period is unwarranted. For one thing, the time period
was relatively brief. Our research shows that nominally
it takes six to nine months for a significant change in
the growth of money to have a measurable impact on
real economic activity, and even longer before prices
are affected. More importantly, the slow growth of
money in those few months was related to several
unusual market developments, which were thought to
be only temporary since the basic forces underlying
Let’s look at what has happened to money growth
recently. During October and November last year the
growth rate of money slowed somewhat from the rates
earlier in 1972, but in December money rose sharply.
Then from December to March money rose at an
unusually slow 2 percent pace, but since March the
stock of money has gone up at an 11 percent rate. In
view of the fact that money apparently affects eco-
nomic activity with a distributed lag over a period of
several quarters, it seems more useful to analyze
money on balance over the period since sometime last
year rather than focus on each of the shorter run
fluctuations. As of June the level of money was up an
estimated 7.4 percent from a year ago. This was ap-
proximately the same rate of increase which prevailed
in both the seven-month period from last November5
and in the period from fourth quarter 1970 to fourth
quarter 1972.
Contrary to the view of some analysts that the slow
growth of the narrowly defined money stock in the
first quarter was monetary overkill, I have been con-
cerned throughout much of this period that monetary
expansion could continue to be excessive. Ia m
strongly persuaded that reduction in monetary stimu-
lus is essential to the elimination of inflationary pres-
sures, and postponement of actions to restrain mone-
tary growth implies that a more costly anti-inflation
battle must eventually be waged.
5
The choice of November 1972 avoids the distortion intro-
duced into rates-of-change calculations from abnormal base
periods, such as December or January.
Money Stock









the trend growth of money continued to expand
rapidly.
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Contributing to my concern is the observation that
the basic forces underlying monetary growth have
continued to be expansionary. Since last November,
for example, Federal Reserve credit has risen at a very
rapid 13 percent annual rate, after increasing just over
7 percent in the previous year. The gro~vthof the
monetary base, which underlies the growth of the
money stock over a period of several months, has
risen at an 8 percent annual rate since last November,
the same as in the previous year.
The growth of money slowed in the first few
months of this year despite the marked acceleration
of Federal Reserve credit and the persistent path of
the monetary base. The explanation of this paradox
lies in the bunching of several market developments
which prevented the rapidly rising base from sup-
porting a proportionately larger growth of money.
These market developments appear to have been
temporary aberrations, for in the past two months
the growth of money has accelerated sharply to a 12.5
percent rate.
An important factor absorbing the monetary base
early in the year was an unusual buildup in Treasury
deposits in commercial banks. These funds in Treas-
ury accounts are not included in the money stock, but
banks are required to hold reserves against these
Treasury deposits the same as private deposits. Dur-
ing the international monetary turmoil, the Treasury
received a large inflow of funds from foreign central
bank purchases of Government securities, as these
foreign banks sought to invest the dollars accumu-
lated in maintaining exchange rates betweeu their
currency and the dollar. Also, early in the year Treas-
ury receipts from personal and corporate income taxes
and from agencies such as the Social Security Ad-
ministration were running well ahead of payments.
In late March, Treasury balances at commercial banks
averaged about $11 billion, up from an average of
about $7 billion in December. It is well known that
the Treasury does not usually hold large idle cash
balances, and as these funds are spent, the private
money stock has expanded.
Other factors contributing to the slower growth of
money relative to base early this year include the
rapid growth of CDs and a marked increase in cur-
rency in the hands of the public. The growth of CDs
at banks absorbs reserves leaving less available to
support private demand deposits and other time de-
posits. Both of these factors are also likely to be
temporary, and as they return to more normal pat-
terns, it would be necessary to reduce the rate of
Page 6
expansion of the monetary base in order to avoid
further acceleration in the growth rate of money.
Economic Outlook
JULY 1973
On balance through the first six months of 1973,
the rate of money growth has been somexvhat less
than the exceptionally high rate of 1972, but this has
not been true for Federal Reserve credit and the
monetary base. If one can assume that the growth
rate of money from this point is, on average, no more
than in the past six months, some slowing in the
growth of total spending on goods and services from
the unusually mapid growth of the past two quarters
can be expected. The rate of GNP gro\vth will prob-
ably slow to about 8 percent by year’s end, but on
average for 1973 the increase should be in the range
of 10 to 11 percent. Of that total, it now appears to us
that about 6 percent will be in real GNP and about
5 percent in overall price increases for the year.
Moderation of spending is desirable, of course,
since the economy is operating at or very near capac-
ity and consequently inflationary pressures have been
intensifying. Even so, I xvonld hope that cutbacks in
aggregate demand would be gradual; othenvise, pro-
duction and employment would be seriously affected.
Capacity limitations constrain production growth to
about a 4 percent rate in the long rim, and given our
experience with prices so far this year, inflation much
below a 5 percent rate on balance for the year is no
-- 1965 1966 1967 196$ 969 2970 1971 1972 2973
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longer attainable without an unusually severe reduc-
tion in production. Over time, the rate of inflationcan
be reduced; however, if an economic downturn is to
be avoided, the transition to stable prices will be a
time-consuming process. This will require both the
patience and the perseverance that is inherent in the
successful avoidance of the traditional massive and
abrupt cutback in monetary stimulus when inflation
is finally recognized as being out-of-hand. Put an-
other way, achieving stability without suffering a re-
cession is possible, but it will take time and highly
disciplined monetary and fiscal actions to get there
from here. I believe it can be accomplished, and hope
those of us involved in the stabilization decision-
making process have the patience, perseverance, and
the wisdom to achieve this.
JULY 1973
Looking into next year, a
growth rate of money in the
range of 4 to 6 percent would
likely be accompanied by a
growth of nominal GNP in the
range of 7 to 8 percent, and
at this point onr best judgment
is that about half, and more
likely less, would be in real
output, and the remainder in
prices. As you can see, I am
not convinced of the necessity
for a recession, nor am I assum-
ing in this analysis any stronger
use of economic controls by the
Administration or Congress to
deal with inflation.6 Id onot
beheve that price-wage con-
trols in and of themselves
should be viewed as a basic
cure for inflation. Since I hold
the view that in the longer run
a high level of employment is
consistent.with relatively stable
prices, I continue to advocate
achieving a stable rate of mon-
etary growth consistent with
that objective. Therefore, as-
sessment of the economic out-
look does not assume that con-
trols are either necessary or
desirable in order to restrain
the rise in prices. A return to more strict controls is
again rumored, and they may come. If so, they may
affect expectations and market interest rates for a
while, and they will certainly affect statistical indi-
cators of economic activity. Under-the-table transac-
tions, black market activity, and product mix changes
do not show up in the published price indexes. How-
ever, controls can have the appearance of working
only if rational fiscal and monetary actions are taken,
Otherwise the conflict between real economic forces
and the administered economic programs will create
a situation which is acceptable to no one.
Table I
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“This presentation was given prior to the June 13, 1973
announcement of a second price freeze followed by Phase IV.
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